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Abstract
Online abusive language detection (ALD) has become a societal issue of increasing importance
in recent years. Several previous works in online ALD focused on solving a single abusive
language problem in a single domain, like Twitter, and have not been successfully transferable
to the general ALD task or domain. In this paper, we introduce a new generic ALD framework,
MACAS, which is capable of addressing several types of ALD tasks across different domains.
Our generic framework covers multi-aspect abusive language embeddings that represent the target
and content aspects of abusive language and applies a textual graph embedding that analyses the
user’s linguistic behaviour. Then, we propose and use the cross-attention gate flow mechanism
to embrace multiple aspects of abusive language. Quantitative and qualitative evaluation results
show that our ALD algorithm rivals or exceeds the six state-of-the-art ALD algorithms across
seven ALD datasets covering multiple aspects of abusive language and different online community
domains. The code can be downloaded from https://github.com/usydnlp/MACAS.
1 Introduction
Abusive language in online communities has become a significant societal problem (Nobata et al., 2016)
and online abusive language detection (ALD) aims to identify any type of insult, vulgarity, or profanity
that debases a target or group online. It is not only limited to detecting offensive language (Razavi et al.,
2010), cyberbullying (Xu et al., 2012), and hate speech (Djuric et al., 2015), but also to more nebulous or
implicit forms of abuse. Many social media companies and researchers have utilised multiple resources,
including machine learning, human reviewers and lexicon-based text analytics to detect abusive language
(Waseem, 2016; Qian et al., 2018). However, none of them can perfectly resolve the ALD task because of
the difficulties of moderating user content and in classifying ambiguous posts (Metz and Issac, 2019). On
the technical side, previous ALD models were developed on only a few subtasks (e.g. hate speech, racism,
sexism) in a single domain (like Twitter), and each specialised model is not successfully transferable to
general ALD in different online communities.
Our research question is, “What would be the best generic ALD model that can be used for different
types of abusive language detection sub-tasks and in different online communities?” To solve this, we
found that Waseem et al. (2017) reviewed the existing online abusive language detection literature,
and defined a generic abusive language typology that can encompass the targets of a wide range of
abusive language subtasks in different types of domain. The typology is categorised in the following
two aspects: 1) Target aspect: The abuse can be directed towards either a) a specific individual/entity
or b) a generalised group. This is an essential sociological distinction as the latter refers to a whole
category of people, like a race or gender, rather than a specific individual or organisation; 2) Content
aspect: The abusive content can be explicit or implicit. Whether directed or generalised, explicit abuse
is unambiguous in its potential to be damaging, while implicit abusive language does not immediately
imply abuse (through the use of sarcasm, for example). For example, assume that we have a tweet “F***”.
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Dataset Source Size Composition
Waseem(Waseem and Hovy, 2016) Twitter 16.2k Racism(11.97%), Sexism(19.43%), None(68.60%)
HatEval(Basile et al., 2019) Twitter 13k Hateful(42.08%), Non-hateful(57.92%)
OffEval(Zampieri et al., 2019) Twitter 13.2k Offensive(33.23%), Not-offensive(66.77%)
Davids(Davidson et al., 2017) Twitter 24.8k Hate(5.77%), Offensive(77.43%), Neither(16.80%)
Founta(Djouvas et al., 2018) Twitter 99k Abusive(27.15%), Hateful(4.97%), Normal(53.85%), Spam(4.97%)
FNUC(Gao and Huang, 2017) Fox News Discussion Threads 1.5k Hateful(28.50%), Non-hateful(71.50%)
StormW(de Gibert et al., 2018) Stormfront(forum) 10.7k Hate(10.93%), NoHate(89.07%)
Table 1: Comparison and Statistical analysis of seven benchmark datasets evaluated in this paper. The
composition column represents different class aspects, and the class distribution in each dataset.
“You are sooo sweet like other girls”. It includes all those aspects; the directed target (“yourself”), the
generalised target (“girls”), the explicit content (“F***”), and the implicit content (“You are sooo sweet”).
Inspired by this abusive language typology, we propose a new generic ALD framework, MACAS
(Multi-Aspect Cross Attention Super Joint for ALD), using aspect models and a cross-attention aspect gate
flow. First, we build four different types of abusive language aspect embeddings, including directed target,
generalised target, explicit content, and implicit content. We also propose to use a heterogeneous graph
to analyse the linguistic behaviour of each author and learn word and document embeddings with graph
convolutional networks (GCNs). Not every online community (e.g. news forums) allows user-to-user
relationship (e.g. follower-following), so we avoid using user-community relationship information. Then,
we propose a cross-attention aspect gate flow to obtain the mutual enhancement between the two aspects.
The gate flow contains two gates, target gate and content gate, then fuses the outputs of those gates. The
target gate draws on the content probability distribution, utilising the semantic information of the whole
input sequence along with the target source, while the content gate takes in the target aspect probability
distribution as supplementary information for content-based prediction. For evaluation, we test six state-
of-the-art ALD models across seven datasets focused on different aspects and collected from different
domains. Our proposed model rivals or exceeds those ALD methods on all of the evaluated datasets.
The contributions of the paper can be summarised as follows: 1) We perform a rigorous comparison of
six state-of-the-art ALD models across seven ALD benchmark datasets, and find those models do not
embrace different types of abusive language aspects in different online communities. 2) We propose a
generic new ALD algorithm that enables explicit integration of multiple aspects of abusive language,
and detection of generic abusive language behaviour in different domains. The proposed model rivals
state-of-the-art algorithms on ALD benchmark datasets and performs best overall.
2 Related Work
2.1 ALD Datasets
We briefly review the seven ALD benchmark datasets (Table 1), which were collected from different
online community sources and focused on multiple compositions. Waseem (Waseem and Hovy, 2016) is
a Twitter ALD dataset regarding the specific aspects of racist and sexist. The collected tweets were labeled
into Racism, Sexism or None. HatEval (Basile et al., 2019) is a Twitter-based hate speech detection dataset
released in SemEval-2019. It provides a general-level hate speech annotation, Hateful or Non-hateful,
especially against immigrants and women. OffEval (Zampieri et al., 2019) covers the Twitter-based
offensive language detection task in SemEval-2019. It annotates as Offensive or Not-offensive, and
includes insults, threats, and any form of untargeted profanity. Davids (Davidson et al., 2017) is a
Twitter-based ALD dataset, which includes three classes, Hate, Offensive or Neither based on the hate
speech lexicon from Hatebase.org. Founta (Djouvas et al., 2018) is a large Twitter-based ALD dataset
claimed to be annotated with high accuracy based on their proposed incremental and iterative annotation
method. It is annotated with four classes, Hateful, Abusive, Normal or Spam. FNUC (Gao and Huang,
2017) is a hate speech detection dataset, which was collected from complete Fox News discussion threads,
and annotated with the general level categories Hateful or Non-hateful. StormW(de Gibert et al., 2018) is
a Stormfront-based hate speech detection dataset with general-level labels Hate and NoHate. Stormfront
is a supremacist forum where people promote white nationalism and antisemitism.
Figure 1: The conceptual architecture of our model MACAS
2.2 ALD Approaches
In the early stages, ALD was commonly addressed via hand-crafted rules and manual feature engineering.
The first reported ALD work(Spertus, 1997) utilised a decision tree to detect hostile messages based on
heuristic rules. Yin et al. (2009) and Razavi et al. (2010) added lexicon-based features together with
semantic rules and designed a linear SVM and Naı¨ve Bayes classifier for detecting hostile language.
Djuric et al. (2015) first applied in ALD neural networks with the paragraph2vec (Le and Mikolov, 2014)
representation. Nobata et al. (2016) introduced a Yahoo! dataset and tested it with neural networks
by applying a combination of word, character-based and syntactic features. Recently, deep learning
techniques have become popular in ALD. Badjatiya et al. (2017) tested FaxtText/Glove, Convolutional
Neural Networks (CNNs), Long Short-Term Memory (LSTMs) in detecting hate speech. Park and Fung
(2017) designed a HybridCNN (word-level and character-level) model on abusive tweet detection in both
one-step and two-step style. Several works have applied bidirectional Gated Recurrent Unit (Bi-GRU)
networks with Latent Topic Clustering (LTC) Lee et al. (2018) and a a transformer-based framework
Buguen˜o and Mendoza (2019). Some works integrated user profiling into their ALD models. Qian et al.
(2018) utilised the bi-LSTM to model the historical behaviour of users to generate inter-user and intra-user
representation. Mishra et al. (2018) applied node2vec (Grover and Leskovec, 2016) to the constructed
community graph of users to derive the user embedding. However, a user profiling-based approach is only
possible when the user profiles are public and when the domain provides the user-community relation
information.
3 The MACAS ALD Model
We propose the Multi-Aspect Cross Attention Super Joint model for ALD. It is designed as an generic ALD
that can embrace different types of abusive language aspects in different online communities. As shown in
Figure 1, MACAS can be divided into three main phases: 1) Multi-Aspect features embedding[Sec.3.1].
The Multi-Aspect Embedding Layer represents understanding of multi-aspects of abusive language for
detecting generic abusive language behaviours. We focus on two main aspects, target and content, and
each aspect has two sub-aspects. 1) Target aspect represents abuse directed towards either a) a specific
individual/entity or b) a generalised group (e.g. gender or race). 2) Content aspect covers a) explicit or
b)implicit. Explicit abuse is unambiguous in its potential to be damaging, while implicit abusive language
does not immediately impact (e.g. sarcasm). In addition to this, if the platform provides users’ historical
posts, we apply Graph Convolutional Network(GCN)s to build a word-document graph embedding that
represents linguistic behaviours of users. Not every online community (e.g. news forums) has user-to-user
relationships (e.g. follower-following), so we avoid using user-community relationship and community
network information. 2) Cross-Attention Gate Flow for integrating multi-aspects [Sec.3.2] The Cross-
Attention gate produces the joint integration of the target aspect and content aspect model and obtains
the mutual enhancement between the two aspects. This is for producing well-integrated multi-aspects
and improving the performance of generic ALD. 3) Final Aggregation of learned ALD embeddings
[Sec.3.3] We aggregate multi-aspect embeddings and the user’s linguistic behaviour embedding across the
online post using convolutional neural networks, and produce the ALD using multi-layer-perceptron.
3.1 Multi-Aspect Embedding Layer 1
3.1.1 Target: Directed Abuse Embedding
Directed abuse is abuse towards a specific individual or entity (Waseem et al., 2017). To model this
aspect, a named entity recognition (NER) approach is used. To train the NER model, we apply stacked
bi-directional LSTMs, which are one of the state-of-the-art models (Chiu and Nichols, 2016). We extract
the vector before the final Softmax layer of the NER model and use it as the Directed Abuse Embedding.
3.1.2 Target: Generalised Abuse Embedding
Generalised abuse tends to target people belonging to a small set of categories, primarily gender. The
gender debiasing embedding (Kaneko and Bollegala, 2019) is applied. The vocabulary set (V ) is split into
4 mutually exclusive sets of words, namely, masculine (Vm), feminine (Vf ), neutral (Vn) and stereotypical
(Vs). Each word is represented by a vector which is calculated by minimising a loss function to satisfy the
criteria: 1) protect the feminine information for words in Vf ; 2) protect the masculine information for
words in Vm; 3) protect the neutrality for words in Vn (iv) remove gender biases for words in Vs.
3.1.3 Content: Explicit Abuse Embedding
For the explicit abuse, whether the target is directed or generalised, explicit abuse is usually indicated by
specific keywords from the homophobic slurs lexicon. We used dict2vec (Tissier et al., 2017), which aims
to learn word embeddings based on natural language dictionaries. In this paper, the model is trained by
Cambridge, Collins, Oxford, dictionary.com, and we add an abusive language lexicon2. This approach
first defines strong pairs and weak pairs of words. If both words appear in each other’s definition, the
word pair is defined as a strong pair. If only one word appears in the other’s definition, the word pair is
defined as a weak pair. If the words do not appear in each other’s definition they are not related. Each
word is represented by a vector. Strongly paired words have more similar vectors then weakly paired
words which in turn have more similar vectors than unrelated words.
3.1.4 Content: Implicit Abuse Embedding
Implicit abusive language does not immediately imply or denote abuse, similar to sarcasm. Here we use a
hybrid of CNN and LSTM-based sarcasm detection models (Ghosh and Veale, 2016). The vector before
the final Softmax layer of the sarcasm detection model is the Implicit Abuse Embedding.
3.1.5 Additional: User Linguistic Behaviour Embedding
We model the graph by setting each comment in the training set as a document. The vocabulary is the set
of all words in the documents. The corpus is the collection of all documents. The nodes of our graph are
the union of the documents and the vocabulary. An edge weighted 1 exists between each node and itself.
An edge exists between a document and a word if the word is in that document. The edge is weighted
with the TF-IDF for the (document, word) pair, within the corpus. An edge exists between two words if
they have a non-negative point-wise mutual information (PMI) with a sliding window size of 20, within
the corpus. The weight for the edge is the PMI for the word pair. The edge weightings are compiled into
an adjacency matrix combined with the graph’s degree matrix and passed into a 2 layer GCN trained
to map each document to each user as a label. For datasets without user id provided, we use the actual
classification target as the document node label. From this network, we obtain embeddings for each node,
that is an embedding of each document or each word. The trained word embeddings Ge are fed into
transformer encoders to get linguistic behaviour outputs.
3.2 Cross-Attention Gate Flow
In the Cross-Attention Gate Flow, first, we use a cross transformer encoder for refining our four types of
embedding: Directed abuse embedding D, Generalized abuse embedding G, Explicit abuse embedding E
and Implicit abuse embedding I . Before putting them into the cross transformer encoders, we combine D
1In this paper, we use only four state-of-the-art natural language processing techniques that represent each abusive language
aspect well. However, we expect that more techniques for each aspect embedding would produce better performance.
2http://www.rsdb.org
(a) CAGF at the Beginning (b) CAGF at the Beginning and the Middle
Figure 2: Variances of Cross-Attention Gate Flow
with G as Target embedding Te and broadcast I to sequence length N , them combine it with E as Content
embedding Ce. Normally, for the transformer encoder (Vaswani et al., 2017), the attention is calculated
using key (K of dimension dk), query (Q), value (V ):
Attention(Q,K, V ) = softmax(
QKT√
dk
)V. (1)
However, to produce the joint integration of target aspect model and content aspect model, we apply the
cross-transformer to Te and Ce. As shown in the Figure 2 for each transformer encoder, we have K,Q,V
for Te and Ce. The K,V of Te and Ce are switched, which means K,V of Te goes to the transformer
encoder of Ce and K,V of Ce goes to Te’s encoder. Then attention is calculated by
Attentioncontent = softmax(
QcK
T
t√
dk
)Vt, Attentiontarget = softmax(
QtK
T
c√
dk
)Vc (2)
We call the cross transformer here Cross at Beginning(CB). Similar to the original transformer encoder,
each encoder contains one or more encoder stack(s), which mainly consists of two sub-layers: a multi-head
attention layer and a fully connected feed-forward neural network (FNN). A residual connection followed
by layer normalization is employed around each of the two sub-layers before feeding to the next sub-layer.
Another way to produce the joint integration occurs before the FNN layer. The output of Multi-Head
Attention will be the input for the FNN layer, and then an Add & Norm layer is applied. Normally, the
output of transformer encoder is calculated by
Output = norm(FNN(OMHA) +OMHA) (3)
The input for FNN can also be switched for Content and Target, which is called Cross in the Middle (CM),
the output of transformer encoder will be calculated by
Th = norm(FNN(CMHA) + TMHA), Ch = norm(FNN(TMHA) + CMHA) (4)
If the cross happens both at the beginning and in the middle, the structure will be called Cross at the
Beginning and in the Middle (CBM). The comparison of different cross transformer structures will be
discussed in 5.2. Both of the input embeddings Te and Ce are of shape [N , De], where De is the sum
of the dimension of the concatenated embedding. The transformer encoder will output Th and Ch in the
same shape [N , De]. The hidden state of encoders Th from Te and Ch from Ce will be used to compute
the initial abusive language probability, which is the major input of our bi-directional aspect gate flow.
On top of the Cross-Attention, we introduce the Bi-directional Aspect Gate Flow that contains two
gates: content gate and target gate. Denote the input sequences to our gates from the previous layer
encoder as Th ∈ RN×DT and Ch ∈ RN×DC where N is the sequence length while DT and DC equal to
dimension of target embedding and content embedding respectively. In the content gate, we first flatten Th
to be Thf ∈ R1×(N∗DT ). We then pass Thf through a dense layer and apply the Softmax function. The
resultant PTh is a D-dimensional probability vector, where D = Ncls is the number of distinct labels to
classify, WC ∈ RD×DC is the weight matrix and bC ∈ R1×D is the bias vector. Then we broadcast PTh
over N tokens. This yields ˆPTh ∈ RN×D. Then we concatenate ˆPTh with transformer encoder output
state Ch from content source, generating the augmented content state OC ∈ RN×(D+DC). We then again
flatten OC and pass the output to the dense layer, producing an output matrix PC ∈ R1×D.
The procedure in the target gate is almost the same as the content gate. Here we flattened the input
sequence Ch, generating the flattened output Chf ∈ R1×(N∗DC). We then pass the result through a
dense layer and apply the Softmax function. The resultant PCh is also broadcast to be ˆPCh and then
concatenated with the target encoder output state Th, where OT ∈ RN×(D+DT ) is the augmented target
state as output matrix. Finally, OT is also flattened and then passed to the dense layer, which produces the
output matrix PT ∈ R1×D.
3.3 Final Fusion
We propose a hierarchical fusion, which fuses linguistic behaviour outputs (PG) with content gate output
(PC) and target gate output (PT ) respectively and uses two CNNs to integrate that fusion to get CC and
CT , then we concatenate CC and CT then flatten it to FF . Finally, a multi-layer perceptron (MLP) is used
for final prediction:
L1 = ReLU(W1 · FF + b1), L2 = ReLU(W2 · L1 + b2), Z = softmax(W3 · L2 + b3) (5)
Three layers are stacked. For the each layer, Wi and bi represent the weight matrix and bias vector, and
the ReLU activation function is used for the first two layers. For the last layer, to get the probability of
each class Z, softmax layer is used.
4 Evaluation Setting
We conducted experiments on all seven datasets with and without GCN as well as using the three different
types of cross-transformer variances, which will be discussed in 5.2. The GCN embedding dimension
for this linguistic behaviour graph is DLBG = 200. For transformer encoder configuration, we used
dropout rate = 0.5, encoder number = 2, head number = 3, and hidden dimension = 1296. The models
are trained with batch size = 16, and lr(learning rate) and number of epochs differ: Waseem: lr = 4e-4,
epochs = 6, HatEval: lr = 1e-7, epochs = 6, OffEval: lr = 1e-7, epochs = 13, Davids: lr = 4e-4, epochs =
6, Founta: lr = 1e-5, epochs = 8, FNUC: lr = 1e-6, epochs = 13, StormW: lr = 1e-6, epochs = 7. The
hyper-parameters are decided by splitting the training set into 90:10 training and validation set.
The followings are the models evaluated in our experiments. TF-IDF features and SVM Classifier
(TIS): TIS (Yin et al., 2009) applies TF-IDF with SVM Classifier to detect abusive language. First,
TF-IDF weights of words are generated and a Support Vector Machine with radial basis function (RBF)
kernel is trained to classify different kinds of abusive languages. One-Two Steps Hybrid CNN (OTH):
OTH (Park and Fung, 2017) used a Hybrid CNN (word-level and character-level) model and applied
it to abusive tweet detection. We applied Chars2vec as a character embedding and Glove as a word
embedding. The convolutional layers with kernel size 256, 128, and 64 are stacked, and the model is
trained using learning rate 4e-5 with 10 epochs. Multi-Features with RNN (MFR): MFR (Mehdad and
Tetreault, 2016) used a hybrid character-based and word-based Recurrent Neural Network (RNN) model
to detect abusive language. After the Chars2vec and Glove embeddings, there is a vanilla stacked RNN.
Three RNN layers with hidden dimensions 128, 128, and 64 are stacked, and the model is trained using
learning rate 4e-6 with 10 epochs. Two-step Word-level LSTM (TWL): TWL (Badjatiya et al., 2017)
produced LSTM-derived representations with a Gradient Boosted Decision Trees classifier. The model
applied LSTM to Glove embeddings, and the results are fed into the model. Three LSTM layers with
hidden dimensions 128,128,64 are stacked, and the model is trained using learning rate 4e-6 with 10
epochs. Latent Topic Clustering with Bi-GRU (LTC): LTC (Lee et al., 2018) applies a Bi-GRU with
latent topic clustering, which extracts the topic information from the aggregated hidden states of the two
directions of the Bi-GRU. Three Bi-GRU layers with hidden dimensions 128, 128, and 64 are stacked,
and the model is trained using learning rate 4e-5 with 10 epochs. Character-based Transformer (CBT):
CBT (Buguen˜o and Mendoza, 2019) uses a transformer-based classifier with Chars2vec embeddings.
Transformer encoders with hidden dimension 400, learning rate 4e-6 with 3 epochs are used.
5 Experiments and Results
5.1 Performance Comparison
In this part, we compare our model with six baseline models over all seven datasets, discussed in Sec
2.1. These baseline models are constructed with various word representations as well as different neural
networks or classifiers. Table 2 presents the weighted average f1 performance of each baseline model
and our model over each dataset. Our model outperforms the baseline models for all these seven datasets.
Applying multiple aspect embeddings enables our model to process the texts from multi-perspective
Dataset/Algorithm TIS OTH MFR TWL LTC CBT Ours
Waseem(Waseem and Hovy, 2016) 83.56 79.10 62.39 73.88 79.94 79.11 86.00
HatEval(Basile et al., 2019) 41.63 40.48 53.17 52.03 53.14 49.25 53.97
OffEval(Zampieri et al., 2019) 75.37 76.84 55.59 67.15 77.90 58.71 78.80
Davids(Davidson et al., 2017) 88.11 88.37 79.44 83.74 87.56 88.94 90.34
Founta(Djouvas et al., 2018) 79.58 78.59 73.64 75.23 79.49 72.04 80.36
FNUC(Gao and Huang, 2017) 68.92 64.51 70.71 65.67 69.78 67.07 73.20
StormW(de Gibert et al., 2018) 82.73 85.48 82.06 81.91 83.83 82.90 85.86
Table 2: Overall f1 results from seven ALD models (including MACAS) evaluated across all seven
benchmark datasets. We highlight the top 2 models for each dataset, using darker colors for higher
performance. For all the benchmark datasets, we train models on the train split and report results on test
splits.
Dataset Abusive Example Actual C. Correctly C. Incorrectly C.
Waseem Really bitch really? Get on the runway and back in the kitchen. Sexism TIS, Ours OTH, MFR, TWL, LTC,CBT
Waseem thegeek chick Please answer... Sexism TIS, Ours OTH, MFR, TWL, LTC,CBT
Waseem RT randomfox: #ManSpreading #FeminismIsAwful #WomenAgainstFeminism Sexism TIS, Ours OTH, MFR, TWL, LTC,CBT
Waseem RT @asredasmyhair: Fems, for the love of God, please stop propagating the wagegap myth. #FemFreeFriday Sexism TIS, Ours
OTH, MFR, TWL, LTC,
CBT
FNUC BLM is a Hate group Given Birth by Obama’s comments That put a target on thebacks of police officers Hateful Ours
TIS, OTH, MFR, TWL,
LTC, CBT
StormW i am a white nationalist of a christian faith but still am a white nationalist forracial survival the anti racist christians are the true chirstians enemy Hate OTH, Ours
TIS, MFR, TWL, LTC,
CBT
Table 3: Some prediction example from our model MACAS compared to the baselines. Actual C.: Actual
Class, Correctly C.: Correctly Classified Models, Incorrectly C.: Incorrectly Classified Models.
views. The Cross-Attention gate flow makes it possible to obtain the mutual enhancement between the two
different aspects. Although some of the baseline models such as OTH, MFR also combine two embedding
approaches (Chars2vec and Glove) to get more information, they still just consider the general information
of the texts rather than extract information in a targeted fashion from various aspects. For these reasons
our model can achieve performance above the baseline models.
As well as comparing our model with the baseline models, we also make some observations from
comparing the six baseline models amongst themselves. Firstly, OTH and MFR use the combined
embeddings of Chars2vec and Glove which gives more information. So, they can achieve relatively better
weighted average f1 scores compared to most other baseline models which just use a single embedding
method. Secondly, the results of TWL and LTC indicate that the bi-directional recurrent neural network
leads to better performance than the simple forward recurrent neural network. This means that not only
the future states but also the past ones will affect the prediction results. Thirdly, although we may not
consider TF-IDF with SVM to be as good as Chars2vec or Glove with deep neural networks, TIS baseline
model never gets the worst weighted f1 score for the seven datasets when compared with other models. In
fact it even outperforms other baseline models on Waseem and Founta. For both datasets, there might be
some particular words which are really significant for identifying the class. So TF-IDF can achieve good
results for these two datasets.
Next, an analysis of examples to show how different models perform on different datasets is conducted,
and the results are shown in Table 3. The first example is from Waseem, “Really bitch really? Get on
the runway and back in the kitchen.”, which should be predicted as Sexism. It is quite explicit in that the
word “bitch” is in this sentence, and this makes TIS predict it as Sexism easily since TF-IDF is focusing
on the word occurrence. Besides, “back in the kitchen” is implicit Sexism, implying women should be in
the kitchen. The similar patterns can be found from the second instance “thegeek chick please answer”
by explicitly mentioning the word ‘chick’. The third and fourth samples represent abusive language or
hate speech about the topic Feminism. The third explicitly stated the words ‘Feminism’ and ‘Awful’
and TIS and our model successfully detected the abuse with an explicit hate speech aspect identification.
Our model, which considers the explicit and implicit aspects, can predict the sentence as Sexism easily.
Another example is from FNUC, “BLM is a Hate group Given Birth by Obama’s comments That put a
target on the backs of police officers” which should be Hateful. This comment insults the “Black Life
Matters” by calling it a Hate Group. Normally, describing something as a hate group is not hate speech,
but in this case, calling BLM a hate group is racism. This is not easy for the baseline models to spot,
Methods Waseem HatEval OffEval Davids Founta FNUC StormW
CB, no G 82.35 53.97 78.80 90.34 80.36 65.31 82.90
CB, G, N=1 86.00 51.88 75.06 87.36 76.90 73.20 84.52
CB, G, N=3 83.76 42.71 75.03 88.24 75.42 68.39 85.86
CBM, no G 81.53 53.28 77.37 90.25 80.28 65.67 84.14
CBM, G, N=1 85.22 39.91 72.60 90.12 76.06 68.92 85.09
CBM, G, N=3 82.77 42.86 75.10 90.11 77.03 68.16 85.12
Table 4: Abusive language detection results across seven benchmark datasets for MACAS with two cross
attention aspect gate flow mechanisms and graph embedding. We highlight the top 2 settings for each
dataset. The darker the colour, the better the performance. The comparison provides different parameters
(N) of final fusion layers, including N=1 or 3. (CB: cross-attention at the beginning, CBM: cross-attention
at the beginning and the middle, G: the user linguistic behaviour graph embedding)
and only our model predicts it correctly. For the last example from StormW, “i am a white nationalist
of a christian faith but still am a white nationalist for racial survival the anti racist christians are the true
chirstians enemy”, the user described himself as “white nationalist” which is one kind of hate speech,
and OTH can predict this sentence as Hate. The reason is that the CNN used in OTH can capture the
information for phrases, which is the “white nationalist” here. Besides, our model can predict this sentence
correctly since the sentence is a general explicit hate speech.
5.2 Ablation Testing - Cross-attention gate flow
In this part, three different structures of cross transformer encoders are tested: 1) Cross-transformer at the
beginning of the the transformer encoder (CB): exchanging content’s and target’s K and V at the beginning
of the transformer encoders as in Figure 2; 2) Cross-transformer in the middle of the transformer encoder
(CM): exchanging content’s and target’s input for Feed Forward layer in the transformer encoder, which is
in the middle of the transformer encoders; 3) Cross-transformer at both places (CBM): the combination of
CB and CM. Due to the poor performance of CM, only results for 7 datasets with CB and CBM structure
are shown in Table 4. Besides, to find whether and how GCN is improving the performance of our model,
different structures are also compared: 1) Model without GCN; 2) Model with GCN using hierarchical
fusion, repeating one or three times. We show one and three times here because on all the datasets our
model achieves the best performance with one or three repeated fusions when GCN is also used. Two
conclusions are drawn based on the results of CB and CBM:
Firstly, the best model is always the CB model, and the second best is always the CBM model with the
same GCN structure. So comparing between CB and CBM structure, CB has a better performance and we
use this structure as our final model. Besides, in most cases, CB outperforms CBM if they share the same
GCN structure, which also shows that, overall, CBM is worse than CB. Considering the fact that CM is
the worst, we can say that cross in the middle transformer encoder will lower the model performance.
Exchanging content’s and target’s K,V is important since it allows target aspects to query on the content
aspects and vice versa. However, exchanging values before Feed Forward Layer only gives a different add
and norm which doesn’t increase the interaction between content aspects and target aspects usefully.
Secondly, our model can have a better performance with GCN when there is user id in the dataset. Not
all the datasets provide user id, and as mentioned in Sec 3.1, User Linguistic Behavior embedding is
trained by using the user id as the target. For those datasets without userid, the real abusive labels are used
as the training target. By comparison, we can find that Waseem, StormW, and FNUC which provide
user id in the datasets have a better performance using a model with GCN, and the other four datasets,
which don’t provide user id, have a better performance using a model without GCN. Therefore, for the
dataset with user id, User Linguistic Behavior which is from GCN, can improve the performance of our
model. And for those datasets without user id, the model structure without GCN is recommended.
5.3 Ablation Testing - Multi-aspect embedding
To check how aspect embeddings contribute to the model, an ablation test on different combinations of
the embeddings is conducted on all these seven datasets. We use the CB model without GCN for the
prediction. Table 5 presents the weighted average f1 scores for 9 different combinations of four aspect
embedding models, including Directed abuse D, Generalised abuse G, Explicit abuse E, and Implicit
Combinations Waseem HatEval OffEval Davids Founta FNUC StormW
D + E 80.16 49.94 75.81 89.58 80.02 66.03 82.23
D + I 61.93 47.04 54.63 68.27 67.88 64.51 81.91
D + E + I 80.57 47.11 69.95 87.11 79.80 64.03 81.91
G + E 79.67 52.78 76.95 86.92 79.39 65.56 84.85
G + I 80.10 53.63 57.38 87.52 79.35 64.24 81.91
G + E + I 79.12 48.71 72.17 89.19 79.14 65.96 82.04
D + G + E 78.63 53.60 73.78 88.51 80.23 68.28 82.44
D + G + I 79.74 52.65 75.12 89.76 79.76 65.31 83.44
D + G + E + I 82.35 53.97 78.80 90.34 81.57 65.31 83.93
Table 5: Ablation studies comparing different types integration of multi-aspects for the generic ALD
model. In the proposed model, MACAS, we introduced four aspect embeddings, including directed abuse
(D), generalised abuse (G), explicit abuse (E), and implicit abuse (I). Directed and generalised abuses
are in the group of a target aspect, while explicit and implicit abuses are in a content aspect group. The
ablation testing is conducted in a different combination of aspect embedding from each higher-level of
aspect groups. The highest performance is highlighted in green, the lowest is marked in red.
abuse I . Each target and content aspect should include at least one embedding.
For Waseem, the D+G+E+I combination achieves the best performance with the weighted average
f1 score 82.35 and most other combinations have a slightly lower performance. In contrast, D + I gets
the worst weighted f1 score of 61.93. The reason why D + I is much worse than other combinations may
lie in two facts: 1) In this dataset, abusive language is generally more explicit rather than directly aiming
at a specific target in an implicit way. 2) Even humans can not distinguish Direct Abuse in an Implicit
way easily, and it can be very difficult for the annotators to annotate the label correctly. Besides, the
D +G+ E + I combination outperforms other cases because it takes all the aspects into consideration.
Similar results occur on other Twitter datasets Davids, HatEval, OffEval and Founta, D +G+ E + I
achieves the best while D + I is much worse. For FNUC, due to the small volume of dataset and
imbalanced labels, not all the combinations have a good prediction result. D +G+ E having the best
performance implies that the dataset doesn’t have a large number of implicit abuse samples. For StormW,
D +G+ E + I gets the best performance. Besides, G+ E also has a good performance. The reason is
that this dataset is collected from a racism forum and most hate speech on that website is generally abusive
in an explicit way. Based on the analysis of the different embedding combinations on these datasets, we
can conclude that the embeddings used may vary based on different kinds of datasets, but combining
them all is always a good idea. Although four specific different embeddings are selected in our model
to represent four different aspects, other kinds of embeddings could also be used as long as they can
represent the corresponding aspects.
6 Conclusion
Abusive language detection is an essential but challenging task, and it is almost impossible to successfully
encompass all different abusive language tasks in different domains. The evaluation also shows that
most of the state-of-the-art ALD algorithms do not generalise their model to different types of abusive
language problems or datasets. In this paper, we proposed a new generic abusive language model, called
MACAS, which applied multi-aspect embeddings to represent generalised characteristics of the domain
and introduced a cross-attention gate flow model to achieve better performance by mutual enhancement
between the target aspect and the content aspect. The results indicate that our framework was successful
and effective in capturing abusive language aspects in different domains. Compared to other ALD models,
our model successfully works in general abusive language detection, and it is hoped that MACAS provides
some insight into the future direction of generic abusive language detection.
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